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ARGUMEW1' 
Appellants/Defendcint and Counterclaim and Cross , 1 1 , -
Plaintiffs, American Coin Portfolios, Inc. and Oakwood Mariut 
Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "American"), 
through their attorneys of record, submit this Brief in Reply 
to Respondents' Brief on appeal (Respondents are hereinafter 
referred to as "Jones"). 
I. L. H. INVESTMENT HAS NEVER FULFILLE.D ITS COVENANTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ORIGINAL OR REVISED COMMODITIF,S 
PURCEASE AGREEMENTS AND AMERICAN HAS RETAIUED ITS 
SECURITY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Point I of the Jones' Brief asserts that "L. H. 
Investment strictly performed its covenants and obligations 
under the original Commodities Purchase Agreement." The 
Jones Brief, however, never confronts the critical facts or 
the controlling law. Jones never disputes that American 
advanced $200,000.00 to L. H. Investment in September 1980, 
that the debt was properly secured by the Trust Deed, and 
that the debt of $200,000.00 was never repaid to American in 
any form by anyone. Jones merely argues that because the 
January 1981 Revised Agreement and Note were executed, that 
the debt and the Trust Deed security were extinguished. '1'1:2 
followinsi cases, cited .for the_ following controlling 
in Aiilerican's Brief, are never discussed, 
or even cited in Jones' Brief: 
1) In Oakman v. Hurd Lumber & Woodwork Co., 
230 N.W. 921 (Mich. 1930), the court was confronted 
with facts virtually identical to those here. The 
plaintiff was an intervening purchaser of the 
property who took his deed subject to a mortgage, as 
did Jones in the present case take his deed 
expressly subject to the Trust Deed of American. 
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that 
defendant's acceptance of substituted renewal notes 
discharged the mortgage, holding: "No change in the 
form of the evidence, or the mode or time of 
payment--nothing short of actual payment of the 
debt, or an express release--will operate to 
discharge the mortgage." Id. (emphasis added); 
accord Smith v. Thomas, 245 P. 399, 401 (Idaho 1926). 
2) When a note is given in renewal of another 
note, it does not raise the presumption of 
extinguishment of the debt. Marking Systems, Inc. 
v. Interwest Film Corp., 567 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah 
1977); see Utah Code Annotated§ 70A-3-802. It must 
clearly appear that it was the intention of the 
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parties to extinguish the debt rc•1nes•er1t ed t•y t 1,,, 
original note. Interstate Trust Co. 
Utah 543, 171 P. 515, 517-15 (1918); accorcJ, Gra_y_ 
Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d Gl3, GJS (193G). 
3) "The renewal agreement was sufficient not 
only to revive the indebtedness but to renew the 
original mortgage as well." Easton v. Ash, 116 P.2d 
433, 437 (Cal. 1941); see Waynesboro Nat. Bank v. 
Smith, 145 S.E. 302, 305-06 (Va. 1928). 
Jones does not address the fundamental distinction 
between the underlying debt--the $200,000.00--and the 
evidence of the debt--the note or renewal note. The Trust 
Deed secures the underlying debt, and a change in the form of 
the evidence of indebtedness is irrelevant. This proposition 
is amplified in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 461: 
Where a note secured by a mortgage is 
taken up, at or before its maturity, and a 
new or renewal note substituted for it, the 
mortgage continues as a security for the 
debt in its new form and there is no change 
in the rights or remedies of the mortgagee 
unless there is an actual agreement or 
mutual intention of the parties that the 
mortgage shall be discharged, or the debt 
regarded as paid, by the new note, or that 
the new note shall not be included within 
the security of the mortgage; and the one 
who claims such an agreement or 
understanding has the burden of proving it. 
(Emphasis added). 
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111e most recent and directly controlling case on the 
," so•r1t facts is First Security Bank of Utah v. Proudfit 
Spuit1n<J Goods Co., 522 P.2d 123 (Utah 1976), which is 
Jiscussed in detail in Americans' Brief at 14-16. In 
Proudfit an intervening lienholder claimed that the banks 
acceptance of a renewal note in an increased debt amount 
constituted payment of the underlying debt and therefore 
released the original Trust Deed security. This court 
reJected that argument. In Jones' Brief at 14, Jones states 
that Proudfit "would be applicable to this case if L. H. 
Investment had not performed under the original contract and 
had obtained an extension of time in which to perform." L. 
H. Investment failed to pay the debt to American and executed 
the Revised Agreement and Note to extend the debt, which is 
the identical failure of performance as occurred in Proudfit, 
when the original note was substituted for a renewal note. 
II. THE ACTUAL INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AS WELL AS THE 
CONTENTS OF ALL EXECUTED DOCUMENTS, INDICATES THE 
CLEAR AND EXPRESSED INTENT TO EXTEND THE DEBT AND THE 
TRUST DEED SECURITY INTEREST WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE 
JANUARY REVISED AGREEMENT AND NOTE. 
In light of the undisputed fact that the underlying 
IPtir to American has never been paid, Jones can only prevail if 
'1t clearly appears that it was the intention of the parties 
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that the execution of the new note a11d the cdncel lat ion of ,,, 
old note should extinguish the debt represented by the olJ 
note." Proudfit, supra, at 124. Because L. H. Investment, ' 
trustor, admits the validity and priority of the American TrusL 
Deed, Jones, at 9-12 of his Brief, argues that the actual 
intent of the parties to extend the debt and security interest 
is irrelevant as to a third party, and Jones asserts that the 
intent of L. H. Investment and American must be drawn from the 
January 1981 written agreements. Jones Brief then argues at 
12-15 that the January Revised Agreement and Note demonstrate 
an intent to extinguish the prior debt at that time. Jones' 
conclusion that the written documents show an intent to 
extinguish the prior debt is patently incorrect (see Section 11 
C below, at 9 et seq.). However, even the initial assumptions 
of law are wrong. 
A. The Actual Intent of the Parties to the Security 
Interest Determines Whether the Debt is Extinguished, 
Not the Words Used in the Contract. 
Proudfit case itself dealt with facts where the 
third party intervening judgment lienor had no knowledge or 
involvement in the transactions between the debtor and the 
'.wlder of the Trust Deed. Hoi;ever, in finding that the renew 0 · 
note continued to be secured by the Trust Deed, this Court 
-5-
t l1dt if an unpaid debt is to be deemed extinguished, the 
111ter1t of the parties must be shown. See also, Oakman, 
eind 59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 461, supra. The policy behind 
tl11s rule is sound. Where the debt to the beneficiary under a 
Trust Deed has never been paid, the actual intent of the 
parties to the Trust Deed should control. The law does not 
favor a forfeiture. The continuation of the Trust Deed as 
security for the renewal note does not place the intervening 
11enholder in any worse position than he was prior to 
acceptance of the renewal note by the beneficiary under the 
1'rust Deed. This is not a case where new money was advanced, 
or where an additional indebtedness that did not previously 
exist burdens the position of the intervening lien holder. 
Thus, the intent of the parties to the Trust Deed is 
controlling. 
Jones' attempts to support the proposition that the 
intent is controlled by the language of the contract, by citing 
cases that have nothing to do with the priority of security 
interests in real estate (Jones Brief at 11-12). Jones cites 
tLe case of James Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, 517 P.2d 410 (Ariz. 
Aµp. 1973). 'l'he lleller case deals with the issue of whether a 
loncJ owner and a realtor were engaged in a joint venture so 
'fiot Lhe service of a lien claim on the construction company 
-6-
constituted service on the realtor. 
apparent authority in the law of agency, the cuurt fuun<J t!
1
,, 
as to third parties, the land owner and the realtor were 
engaged in a joint venture. Obviously, when persons act as 
joint venturers, they will be bound by the knowledge of their 
joint venturer even though the actual intent may be otherwise, 
This theory is not analogous to the situation where Jones had 
already taken its deed as security expressly subject to the 
American Trust Deed, and American chose to rollover or renew 
the Note, placing Jones in no worse position than Jones was 
prior to the renewal. The remaining two supporting cases c1te 1: 
on page 11 of Jones' Brief, do not warrant discussion. In the 
Stearn and Lepel cases, the courts briefly discuss the issue oi 
whether a husband and wife are engaged in a joint venture, and 
the cases contain no discussion of real estate, trust deeds or 
intervening security interests. 
B. Assuming, arguendo, that the Language of the 
Written Agreements Controls Intent as to Third Parties, Jones 
Was Not Such a Third Party. 
It is undisputed that Jones took his deed expressly 
subject to American's Trust Deed for $200,000.00 (R. at 19). 
There i3 also no dispute that the indebtedness secured by 
American's Trust Deed was rolled over in October and November. 
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l ·'"''· pri·ir to Jones taking his Deed. Jones, admits that these 
s in October, November and December did not extinguish 
"' 1et1t to American or release the prior Trust Deed (see Jones 
r:11et at 12-13). Therefore, Jones took his deed subject to the 
Trust Deed and the rollover procedure, which had already 
occurred on two occasions. The only function of the January 
1981 Revised Agreement and Note was to formalize this rollover 
procedure. 
Additionally, even after the execution of the January 
1981 Revised Agreement and Note, Jones continued to acknowledge 
the validity and priority of the American Trust Deed. On 
February 16, 1981, Jones executed a Trust Deed to the Subject 
Property in favor of a third party (R. 398-400), and the legal 
description therein specifically recites that this conveyance 
by Jones was expressly subject to American's Trust Deed (R. 
400). As late as May 5, 1981, after American had recorded its 
Notice of Default, Jones' attorney delivered written 
instructions directing the recording of an escrowed warranty 
deed from Jones to L. H. Investment upon certain conditions (R. 
408), which escrowed warranty deed expressly recites the 
c•.mt 1 nuat ion of the American Trust Deed ( R. 396). 
Jones was not an innocent third party without 
hut took subject to the Trust Deed and the rollover procedure, 
-8-
and acknowledged the validity of tl1e Trust Deed until almost 
the commencement of th1s action to stop Amer1cdt1's 
sale. 
C. Tne Express Language of the Revised Agreement , 
Note establishes the Clear Intent to Continue the Debt to 
American and the Security of the Trust Deed. 
Jones' Brief at 12-13 states that the October 1980 
Amendment to the original Commodities Purchase Agreement 
remains secured by the September 1980 Trust Deed because the 
October Amendment recited that it was supplemental to the 
previous agreement, whereas the January 1981 Revised Agreement 
contains a boiler plate integration clause, which states that 
' the Agreement supersedes all prior agreements of the parties. 
Jones, however, completely ignores six distinct 
provisions and aspects of the January Revised Agreement that 
clearly indicate on the face of the documents that there '· 
intention to extinguish the prior debt or agreements or releas' 
the Trust Deed security: 
(1) The original September 1980 Commodities 
Purchase Agreement and the October Amendment thereto 
also erroneously asserts at 13 that tne 
January Revised Agreement recites full performance of the 
original Commodities Purchase Agreement. 
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ire ,ittached to the Revised Agreement as Exhibit "A". 
1See Recital Con page 1 of Revised Agreement 
R. 293-301). 
( 2) Paragraph 29 on page 8 of the Revised 
Agreement states that all Exhibits annexed to the 
Revised Agreement are expressly made a part of the 
Agreement. "All references to this Agreement,. 
shall deem to refer to and include this Agreement and 
all such Exhibits and writings. Any breach or default 
under the provisions of any of such writings shall, 
for all purposes, constitute a breach or default under 
this Agreement and all other such writings." Thus, 
the prior agreements and debt were not only not 
extinguished, but by the express language of paragraph 
29, were kept alive under the Revised Agreement and 
could be the subject of a default. 
( 3) Paragraph 1 on page 2 of the Revised 
Agreement specifically states that L. H. Investment 
"shall continue to apply the Two Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($200,000.00) advanced by American Coin. 
(Emphasis Added). Thus indicating no payment of the 
$200,000.00 and no intent to extinguish this 
underlying debt. 
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(4) Paragraph 7 on pages 3 and 4 of the Revise 
Agreement specifically recites that the September 
Trust Deed to American "shall be extended and shrill 
provide security for the performance of all 
obligations under this Agreement and Trust Deed 
Note." The intent is thus not only clear to 
the debt, but to continue and "extend" the Trust Deea 
Security for the underlying debt. 
(5) The fact that the January 1981 Agreement is 
called a "Revised" Agreement indicates the intent of 
the parties to continue the prior Agreement, with 
certain modifications, and not an intent to 
the entire debt and enter into a totally new 
transaction. 
( 6) Recitals C through H of the Revised 
Agreement outline the September 1980 Original 
Commodities Purchase Agreement as well as the October, 
November and December rollover's as a continuous 
transaction, and never indicate that there has been ° 
payment or satisfaction of the underlying debt. 
Importantly, Jones never attempts to show any 
substantive differerce between the rollover procedures employe: 
in October and November 1980, prior to the time Jones took hi; 
-11-
, - 1 ,-u,,J the procedure formalized in the January Revised 
-rnt'r1t and Note. Jones' argument is essentially that if the 
,, 11,ver l-'rocedure utilized in October, November and December 
1,dd not been formalized by the January Revised Agreement, that 
American's Trust Deed would continue to secure the $200,000.00 
debt to this date, but that because of the written 
formalization of the identical rollover procedure, the security 
interest of American has somehow been lost. 
Jones Brief at 13 argues that the execution of a new 
promissory note in January, 1981 provides evidence that the 
January Revised Agreement and Note were intended to extinguish 
the underlying debt. Of course, American's original brief 
cited several cases where this court and other jurisdictions 
hdve held that mere execution of a renewal note does not raise 
the presumption that the debt has been extinguished (See 
Appellant's Brief at 13-17). However, Jones does not review 
the provisions of the January 1981 Note, which clearly indicate 
within the Note itself that the intent of the parties was not 
to extinguish the debt or release the security interest (R. 
2')0 -92): 
(1) Attached to the January Note were not only 
the 1981 Revised Agreement, but also the original 
Commodities Purchase Agreement and the October 
-12-
Amendment. The tlote recites in the second parayra 1 i 
that it is given in acknowledyement of the sum of 
$200,000.00 paid by American "in accordance with the 
terms of the attached hereto and marked 
Exhibit "A". 
( 2) The last sentence in the second paragraph of 
the Note states that the note shall be deemed paid in 
full upon strict performance under the attached 
( 3) The third paragraph of the note speci ficallv 
recites that it is secured by the September 1980 Trust 
Deed. 
(4) The fact that the January Note was in the 
face amount of $219,000.00 is of no consequence. This 
amount is merely the original $200,000.00 
American, plus the $19,000.00 discount premium to be 
paid pursuant to the terms of the original Commodities 
Purchase Agreement. 
The conclusion that the Revised Agreement and Note 
were intended to extinguish the debt and security interest 1s 
not only directly contrary to numerous provisions of the 
Revised Agreement and Note. but is completely untenable in 
light of the standards set forth in Proudfit: Taking of a 
--13-
,,.J.J 1 note does not extinguish the debt unless such clearly 
'i"'"' '° as the intent of the parties. 
111. THE JANUARY 1981 REVISED AGREEMENT AND NOTE DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A FUTURE ADVANCE. 
Point II of Jones Brief at 15-20 sets forth the red 
herring "future advance" argument. Jones argues that "since 
the obligations under the original Commodities Purchase 
Agreement were fully performed and the original. Note 
thereby fully paid," then the January Revised Agreement 
constitutes a future advance of new debt that should not be 
secu1ed under the Trust Deed's "dragnet clause". This argument 
is adequately addressed in American's original Brief at 18-19. 
The underlying $200,000.00 indebtedness to American was never 
paid, extinguished or released, therefore there was no advance 
at all in January, 1981, future or otherwise. American does 
not rely on the dragnet clause of the Trust Deed. 
All cases cited by Jones deal with the security for 
advances of new, additional money by the lender subsequent to 
an intervening lien. This is not an issue in cases like the 
present, dealiny with rollovers of debt or renewal notes. See 
Pr0ucl fit; Oakman Hurd Lumber; Gray v. Kappos; Easton v. Ash; 
_l11tc,rstilte Trust v. Headlund, supra, and other cases cited 
and in Appellant's Brief. 
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Jones Brief at 12 states that the case •Jf Vall.'lb_ci_lt 
Crown Plumbing and Sewer Service, Inc., 523 S.W.2d 72 (Tx. 
App. 1975) has "facts strikingly similar to the present case. 
In Vaughan, the mortgagee asserteu a prior security interest 
for new loans and advances of money subsequent to the purchase 
of the property by Crown, which were in add1t1on to the 
original indebtedness. In fact, the mortgagee was the 
mortgagor's attorney and one such alleged new advance was for 
subsequent unpaid attorney's fees owed to the mortgagee. Id. 
at 74, 76. The court found that these new subsequent loans 
were not reasonably contemplated in the Trust Deed. Id. at 
76-77. In the present case there was no new advance or 
additional loan whatsoever, but only the original 
indebtedness. This unpaid $200,000.00 indebtedness to America: 
was obviously within the contemplation of Jones when Jones too;. 
his deed, because the deed by its express terms is subject to 
the debt and Trust Deed. 
In any event, the cases dealing with whether a dragn• 
clause will cover a future advance, state that the question is 
whether such was intended by the parties. See First Security 
Bank v. Shiew, G09 P.2d 952, 955-5G (Utah 1980) and other case' 
cited in Appellant's Brief at 19. At a minimum, American has 
right to a trial as to the intent of the parties. 
-] 5-
IV THE PRINCIPLES EQUITABLE SUBROGATION, EQUITABLE 
SUBORDINATION AND EQUITABLE MORTGAGE REQUIRE THAT 
AMERICAN kETAIN ITS SECURITY INTEREST. 
It is unnecessary for American to rely upon equitable 
doctrines to establish its security interest priority, because 
ti1e secured indebtedness was never satisfied and the Revised 
Agreement and Note expressly recite that they continue to be 
secured by the Trust Deed. Jones attacks the application of 
Lhe equitable doctrines by again stating that L. H. Investment 
extinguished the debt by executing a renewal note, and thus 
arguing that the equities favor Jones. 
The principle behind the equitable doctrines is to do 
justice between the parties. American took a first Trust Deed 
position and advanced $200,000.00, which was never repaid. 
Jones took his deed with knowledge of, and expressly subject 
to, the American Trust Deed. Jones never changed his position, 
or in any way relied on an alleged extinguishrnent of the 
Arner ican debt. In fact, after the execution of the January 
Revised Agreement, Jones executed a trust deed to a third 
party, which trust deed's legal description again recited that 
it was subject to American's trust deed. (R. at 398-400). The 
1,1ter1t of oill partes, including Jones, was to continue the 
u11ur1ty of American's security interest. 
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V. 'fHE LOWER COURT'S SUllMARY ,JUDGMENT RU L HJG WAS rLlll 
ERROR. 
The result reached in the couct below was part1cu 1 
inappropriate in light of the summary judgment posture of t,e 
case. American brought its summary judgment motion, wit11 n,, 
cross-motion from Jones. 'l'he Court, in the order prepared bj 
Jones' counsel, did not merely deny American's motion, but 
recited that the January 1981 Revised Agreement and Note were 
not secured by the Subject Property. Although the court 
appeared willing to change this order on rehearing, by the 
the court issued its order months later, the court, without 
explanation, summarily denied American's Motion to Amend, 
Vacate or Reconsider. 
Jones argues that because counsel for American stated 
in oral argument that there were no disputed facts to rule on 
American's own Motion for Summary Judgment, that somehow 
American is estopped from now claiming that there are 
facts when the court in effect granted Summary Judgment for 
Jones. To obtain Summary Judgment, American only needed to 
show non-payment of the under lying de ht, and no ext i ngu i shment 
of the debt or release of the Trust Deed would he presumed. 
Oakman v. Hurd LuI'.lber and Woodwork Co., at 921; Srn1_1:_l_e_ 
-1., _ 
,,, ic;, supra, "it 401; Marking Systems, Inc. v. Inten1est Film 
, L c;upr a, at 1 7C. However, for Jones to be granted Summary 
J,J,Jment, Jones had to show the "clear" intent of the parties 
extinguish the debt through execution of the Revised 
and Note, because the debt was admittedly never 
Proudfit, supra, at 124. The intent of the parties to 
extinguish the debt and release the Trust Deed was at a minimum 
a disputed issue of fact. 
Furthermore, the court's order that American had no 
security interest in the Subject Property, leads to an absurd 
result. American has shown that Jones took his deed as a 
security interest only in connection with a sale of diamonds by 
Jones (see Appellant's Brief at 6). Indeed, L. H. Investment 
has instituted suit against Jones to declare the Jones deed 
invalid (Third District Court, Civil No. C81-1858). If Jones 
has only a security interest in the Subject Property, then even 
dssuming, arguendo, that Jones security interest is prior to 
American's, American still has an interest in the Subject 
Property, because L. H. Investment, the grantor to both Jones 
funerican, admits the validity of American's Trust Deed 
while contesting the Jones' deed in a separate action. 
H<>1<ever, the order appealed from completely divests American of 
111y interest in the Subject Property. 
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CONCLUSION 
Jones never addresses the controlling fdcts and law 
The debt to American was never paid, satisfied, released or 
extinguished in any form. The 1981 Revised Agreement and Note 
that Jones relies on to show the necessary intent to extinguish 
the debt, specifically attach and incorporate all prior 
agreements, recite the continuing obligations, and expressly 
provide that they continue to be secured by the prior Trust 
Deed. 
American requests that this Court reverse the Summary 
Judgment and the findings of the April 27, 1982 Order, with 
directions to enter judgment in favor of American, or in the 
alternative, vacate the Judgment and Order and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, this 2nd day of September, 
1983. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By /(_/ -,- 7 ;0 
Kent T. Anderson 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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